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Excessive entry in a bilateral oligopoly 
 
1. Introduction 
While there is a vast literature on the welfare effects of entry, the previous works did 
not pay attention to the vertical relationship between the firms, which is very common 
in real world. For example, automobile manufacturers purchase steel, tire and many 
other parts produced by other firms. The markets for microprocessors, aircraft-
engines, packaged products and energy or power generating sectors are also 
characterized by vertical relationship. However, it is often found that the vertical 
relationships between the firms are characterized by bilateral relationships. For 
example, the survey by Cusumano and Takeishi (1991) find that the cases of 
procuring parts from only one supplier account for 59% of their U.S. sample and 70% 
of their Japanese sample. They also found that the relationships between the 
manufacturers and the suppliers are long term and stable. 
In a recent paper, Ghosh and Morita (2007) show that, in case of bilateral 
oligopoly, entry is always insufficient if the suppliers of the intermediate products 
have sufficiently strong bargaining power.
1 While the finding by Ghosh and Morita 
(2007) is interesting, we show that this result is very much dependent on their use of 
“efficient bargaining” model, where the upstream and the downstream agents bargain 
over both the input prices and input quantities. Using the “right-to-manage” model of 
a vertically related industry, where the upstream and the downstream agents bargain 
for the input prices and the downstream agents keep the autonomy in determining the 
                                                 
1 In another paper, Ghosh and Morita (2005) show insufficient entry in a vertical structure, where the 
intermediate products are sold through the market instead of vertical negotiations.   2
amount of the inputs to be used, we show that, even if the upstream agents have full 
bargaining power, entry is excessive in a bilateral oligopoly if the cost of entry is not 
very high. Hence, our paper complements Ghosh and Morita (2007) and shows that 
whether the anti-competitive entry regulation is justified under bilateral oligopoly 
depends on the bargaining structure between the upstream and the downstream 
agents. 
It is worth mentioning that right-to-manage model is a standard and widely 
used model of a vertically related industry. For example, considering the upstream 
agents as labor unions, Nickell and Andrews (1983), Corneo (1995), Bughin and 
Vannini (1995), Naylor (2002), Lommerud et al. (2003), Haucap and Wey (2004), 
López and Naylor (2004) and Mukherjee (2007), to name a few, use the right-to-
manage model in different contexts to show the implications of imperfectly 
competitive markets. Further, Layard et al. (1991) provide arguments for using the 
right-to-manage model vis-à-vis the efficient bargaining model. 
It must be noted that we do not mean that the use of the efficient bargaining 
model is not appropriate. The point we want to make here is that whether a vertically 
related industry follows the efficient bargaining model or the right-to-manage model 
is perhaps an empirical question, and they may be seen in different industries or in 
different countries. Therefore, when examining the justification for anti-competitive 
entry regulation under bilateral oligopoly, one must be careful about the bargaining 
structure between the upstream and the downstream agents. 
  The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 considers a 
right-to-manage model of a bilateral oligopoly and shows the results. Section 3 
concludes. 
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2. The model and the results  
Let us consider an industry with a large number of symmetric downstream firms, each 
of whom must decide whether to enter the downstream sector. In case of entry, each 
downstream firm needs to incur an entry cost K . If n downstream firms enter, each 
of them is the paired with an upstream firm. The upstream firms provide inputs to the 
respective downstream firms. To convey the message of this paper in the simplest 
way, i.e., to show that excessive entry occurs under bilateral oligopoly with 
significant bargaining power of the upstream agents, we believe that it is enough to 
consider the case of full (or maximum) bargaining power of the upstream firms. 
Hence, we consider that the upstream firms set the input prices and the respective 
downstream firms purchase inputs according to their requirements. The downstream 
firms then transform the inputs to a final homogeneous good with a constant marginal 
cost, which is normalized to zero. For simplicity, we assume that the cost of 
producing the input is zero. We also assume that the downstream firms have 
symmetric production technology, and each downstream firm requires one input to 
produce one unit of output. It is also worth mentioning that a downstream firm can 
use only the inputs produced by the upstream firm who is paired with this 
downstream firm.  
We assume that the inverse market demand function is  
  q a P − = ,           ( 1 )  
where the notations have usual meanings. 
  We consider the following game. At stage 1, the downstream firms decide 
whether to enter the industry or not. At stage 2, each upstream firm sets the input 
price for the respective downstream firm. At stage 3, the downstream firms compete   4
like Cournot oligopolists to determine their equilibrium outputs, and buy the inputs 
according to their requirements. The profits are realized. We solve the game through 
backward induction.  
Given that n downstream firms have entered and the ith upstream firm, 
n i ,..., 2 , 1 = ,  charged  i w  as the per-unit price for its input, the ith downstream firm, 
n i ,..., 2 , 1 = , maximizes the following expression to determine its output: 
  K q w q a Max i i
qi
− − − ) ( .       (2) 

























i ,   n i ,..., 2 , 1 = .      (3) 
Since, each downstream firm requires one input to produce one unit of output, (3) also 
shows the input demand faced by the ith upstream firm,  n i ,..., 2 , 1 = . Therefore, the 
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w w w n . As the number of firms in the downstream sector increases, it 
reduces the equilibrium input price. 
  Hence, the equilibrium net profit of the ith downstream firm who has decided 










π .          ( 5 )  
For the analytical convenience, we consider the number of firms as a 
continuous variable. Hence, entry in the downstream sector occurs until the net profit 
of a new entrant becomes zero. Therefore, given the symmetry of the firms, the free 
entry equilibrium number of firms in the downstream sector is given by the following 
zero profit condition: 









.           ( 6 )  
In other words, condition (6) shows the number of firms entering the downstream 
sector in the free entry equilibrium. It follows from (6) that, if the cost of entry (i.e., 
K  falls), the number of firms in the free entry equilibrium increases. 
  Let us now determine the welfare maximizing number of firms, where the 
welfare is given by the sum of the total net profits of the downstream firms, the total 
profits of the upstream firms and consumer surplus. Following the literature on 
excess-entry theorem, we consider the second-best problem of welfare maximization. 
In other words, we determine the welfare maximizing number of firms subject to 
Cournot behavior of the firms. Hence, the social planner can control the number of 
firms entering the downstream sector, but it cannot control the output choice behavior 
of the firms. 
 If  n downstream firms produce, it follows from (5) that the net profit of the 









π ,  n i ,..., 2 , 1 = . Hence, the total net profit of 










π .          ( 7 )  










w w w n , the 
equilibrium amount of input supplied by the ith upstream firm is 





n i ,..., 2 , 1 = . Hence, the profit of the ith upstream firm is 
3
2




Ui ,  n i ,..., 2 , 1 = . 
Therefore, the total profit of the upstream firms is 
3
2 2




nUi .         (8) 
Since, the total final goods production is equal to 
2
2

















CS .         (9) 
Therefore, the social planner chooses n to maximize social welfare (which is the sum 
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It follows from (11) that as the cost of entry (i.e., K ) falls, the welfare maximizing 
number of firms increases. 
 
Proposition 1: (i) The welfare maximizing number of firms is lower than the number 
of firms in the free entry equilibrium, if the welfare maximizing number of firm is at 
least 4. In this situation, entry is excessive from the social point of view. 
(ii) If the welfare maximizing number of firm is at most 3, the number of firms in the 
free entry equilibrium is lower than the welfare maximizing number of firms, and 
entry is insufficient in this situation.
2 
Proof: Assume that (11) holds, i.e., we determine the welfare maximizing number of 
firms. Comparing left hand sides (LHSs) of (6) and (11) at the welfare maximizing 
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) 1 (
, i.e., the number of firms in the free entry equilibrium is 
                                                 
2 Though, in our analysis, we consider the number of firms as a continuous variable, while writing this 
proposition we keep in mind that the number of firms in reality takes integer values. Hence, we avoid 
writing the number of firms between 3 and 4 in the proposition.   8
greater than the welfare maximizing number of firms, which implies that entry is 
excessive in this situation. 
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, which implies that the number of firms in the free entry 
equilibrium is lower than the welfare maximizing number of firms. Hence, entry is 
insufficient in this situation.                                Q.E.D. 
 
  Since it follows from (6) and (11) that both the number of firms in the free 
entry equilibrium and the welfare maximizing number of firms increase with lower 
K , Proposition 1(i) suggests that entry is excessive if the cost of entry is not very 
high so that the welfare maximizing number of firm is at least 4. Hence, it contradicts 
the finding of Ghosh and Morita (2007), where entry is never excessive if the 
upstream agents have sufficiently strong bargaining power. 
  The reason for the difference between our result and that of Ghosh and Morita 
(2007) is attributable to the different bargaining structures considered in these papers. 
In Ghosh and Morita (2007), the upstream agents bargain over both the input prices 
and the input quantities. The possibility of bargaining over the input quantities helps 
the upstream and the downstream agents to choose the input quantity in a way so that 
they can maximize their post-entry joint profits, which are divided between them by 
the input prices according to their bargaining powers. As the bargaining power of the 
downstream agent falls, it reduces the downstream agent’s share of the post-entry 
joint profit and therefore, it reduces its incentive for entry. If the bargaining power of 
the upstream agents is very high, it significantly reduces the downstream agents’ 
incentives for entry, and creates insufficient entry from the social point of view.   9
In contrast, in our analysis, the upstream agents cannot determine the input 
quantities, and therefore, the joint profit maximizing role of the input quantities are 
not present here. Instead, we have the standard case of “double marginalization”, and 
the upstream agents must be careful about the effects of the input prices on the input 
demands. Hence, in our analysis, even if the upstream agents have full bargaining 
power, the post-entry profits of the downstream agents remain significant, thus 
providing significant incentives for entry. Further, higher competition in the product 
market helps to reduce the input price, thus reinforcing the “business stealing 
incentive” of the new entrant. Hence, if the cost of entry is not very high, the number 
of downstream firms entering the industry is not very small, and the equilibrium input 
price is not very high. In this situation, significant business stealing incentive remains 
for the new entrant, thus creating excessive entry for not very high entry costs. If the 
entry cost is very high, the number firms entering the market is small, and therefore, 
the equilibrium input price is very high, which, in turn, reduces the business stealing 
incentive significantly and creates insufficient entry for high entry costs.  
We have shown excessive entry with full bargaining power of the upstream 
agents. However, it must be clear that as the bargaining power of the upstream agents 
falls, it reduces the equilibrium wage rates for a given number of downstream agents, 
thus increasing the incentive for entry by raising the post-entry profits of the 
downstream agents. Hence, the case of excessive entry increases with lower 
bargaining power of the upstream agents. On the extreme case of no bargaining power 
of the upstream agents, our analysis coincides with the previous works on excessive 
entry without a vertical structure, where entry is always socially excessive. 
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3. Conclusion 
Ghosh and Morita (2007) show that entry is always socially insufficient in a bilateral 
oligopoly if the upstream firms have sufficiently strong bargaining power. We show 
that this conclusion very much depends on their use of the efficient bargaining model. 
Using the right-to-manage model, we show that, even if the upstream agents have full 
bargaining power, entry is socially excessive in a bilateral oligopoly if the cost of 
entry is not very high. Hence, as a policy implication, whether anti-competitive entry 
regulation is justified in a bilateral oligopoly depends on the bargaining structure 
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